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BEYOND MOOTING: DESIGNING AN 
ADVOCACY, ETHICS AND VALUES 
MATRIX FOR THE LAW SCHOOL 
CURRICULUM
BOBETTE WOLSKI*
I INTRODUCTION
Moots are a common feature of the law school curriculum in 
Australia and elsewhere.1 While many commentators argue that 
moots have potential as serious learning tools,2 they also express 
concerns over a number of issues surrounding their use. Moots have 
long been criticised for their lack of realism,3 for focusing too much 
on appellate court argument and for their ‘infatuation’4 with the court 
of last resort. 
The most recent expressions of concern are that:
1 Mooting focuses too much on skills.5 Gillespie argues that we 
have lost sight of the potential for the use of moots as part of 
the learning process and as a vehicle for the development of 
substantive knowledge.6
 * Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Bond University.
1 Gillespie notes that moot courts can be found throughout the Commonwealth, 
in the US and in Ireland (Gillespie’s research concerned mooting at law schools 
in the UK): Alisdair A Gillespie, ‘Mooting for Learning’ (2007) 5 Journal of 
Commonwealth Law and Legal Education 19, 19. The moot has even made its 
way to Sweden: see Jacob W F Sundberg, ‘Moot Court: An American Idea in a 
Nordic Setting’ (1997) 19 Justice System Journal 229.  
2 See, eg, Gillespie, above n 1, 35; Michael V Hernandez, ‘In Defense of Moot 
Court: A Response to “In Praise of Moot Court – Not!”’ (1998) 17 Review of 
Litigation 69, 74; Darby Dickerson, ‘In Re Moot Court’ (1999–2000) 29 Stetson 
Law Review 1217, 1217–18; and Joel Butler and Rachel Mansted, ‘The Student 
as Apprentice: Bridging the Gap between Education, Skills and Practice’ (2008) 1 
Journal of the Australian Law Teachers Association 287, 288.
3 See, eg, John T Gaubatz, ‘Moot Court in the Modern Law School’ (1981) 31 
Journal of Legal Education 87, 87; Alex Kozinski, ‘In Praise of Moot Court – 
Not!’ (1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 178, 180, 194; and Lee Stuesser, ‘Skills 
for the Masses: Bringing Clinical Skills to More Students at Less Cost’ (1992) 10 
Journal of Professional Legal Education 119, 126.
4 Gaubatz, above n 3, 88.
5 Gillespie, above n 1, 23, 28, 35.
6 Ibid 28, 35.
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2 Mooting is used primarily for summative assessment purposes, 
rather than as a way in which to provide students with formative 
feedback on their learning of substantive law and skills.7
3 Mooting sometimes takes place too early in law degrees, when 
students’ neophyte skills have not developed suffi ciently to 
enable them to handle its complexities.8 Also, little provision is 
made across the curriculum for the incremental development of 
such skills.9
Another concern canvassed in this article is that the ‘traditional 
moot’ provides limited opportunity for students to gain an 
understanding and awareness of legal ethics and values (as opposed 
to an understanding and awareness of court etiquette). 
The academic literature on mooting has not, thus far, always 
made clear whether the concerns about mooting are intrinsic to the 
traditional moot, whether they arise because of the way in which 
moots are incorporated into the law curriculum or because of a 
combination of these two factors. It is submitted in this article that 
we need to make this distinction if we are to deal with the concerns 
raised about moots. Also largely absent from the literature are 
sustainable solutions that address the concerns raised. This article 
offers one possible solution.
Part II of the article deconstructs the moot — its defi nitions, 
history, salient features and objectives. Part III discusses a range of 
concerns about mooting, drawing on literature from Australia, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). It also examines 
the problems associated with mooting through the experiences of 
Bond University, School of Law. The concerns are divided into three 
categories according to whether they derive from the nature of the 
moot (referred to under the heading ‘the moot problem’); the way 
in which moots are integrated into the curriculum and used by law 
schools (dealt with under the heading ‘the integration challenge’); 
7 Ibid 32–3 (Gillespie reports that moots were summatively assessed in all instances 
where moots were offered as a component of a skills-based module and in 83 per 
cent of all modules using moots — the percentage dropped to 83 per cent when 
allowance was made for discrete mooting modules ‘where it would be expected 
that more than one moot would be undertaken’). Also see Keyes and Whincop, 
who maintain that ‘the traditional moot is inherently summative’: Mary E Keyes 
and Michael J Whincop, ‘The Moot Reconceived: Some Theory and Evidence on 
Legal Skills’ (1997) 8 Legal Education Review 1, 18.      
8 Gaubatz, above n 3, 91; Robert J Martineau, ‘Moot Court: Too Much Moot and 
Not Enough Court’ (1981) 67 American Bar Association Journal 1294, 1296. The 
reference to ‘neophyte skills’ is taken from Wade’s infl uential work, John H Wade, 
‘Legal Skills Training: Some Thoughts on Terminology and Ongoing Challenges’ 
(1994) 5 Legal Education Review 173, 183.
9 Gillespie, above n 1, 27. This concern is raised not only in relation to undergraduate 
law students in the UK and Australia. It has also been raised in relation to graduate 
law students in the US: see, eg, Martineau, above n 8, 1296. Generally, on the lack 
of systematic and incremental skills development in the law curriculum, see Wade, 
above n 8, 183.
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or both. Part IV proposes ways to address these concerns, and raises 
some ongoing challenges that still need to be addressed. 
II DECONSTRUCTING THE MOOT
A Defi nitions and History
Within the context of legal education, a moot is most commonly 
defi ned as ‘a discussion of a hypothetical case as an academic 
exercise’.10 Moots can be traced back to the English Inns of Court 
of the 14th century, where they were used to train barristers.11 The 
‘discussion’ at the centre of a moot evolved into ordered presentations 
by students of opposing arguments based on legal issues raised by 
a hypothetical case.12 Lynch concludes that ‘there are three key 
features of mooting which have remained from the Inns of Court and 
continue in practice today’.13 These are: students assuming the role 
of advocates before a simulated bench; arguing points of law arising 
from a hypothetical scenario; and responding to questions from 
the bench.14 This defi nition is wide enough to include all mooting 
competitions.
B The Modern Moot ‘Process’ — Salient Features
The ‘mooting process’ in law schools today is structured and formal 
and is now referred to as the ‘traditional moot’.15 Students are usually 
provided with a moot problem which essentially consists of three 
parts:16
1 A common predetermined set of ‘facts’ and evidentiary fi ndings. 
The facts are not in dispute in a moot and there is no requirement 
to present evidence.
10 Della Thomson (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary Of Current English (9th
ed, 1995) 883. For further discussion on the meaning of the noun ‘moot’, see 
Kozinski, above n 3, 194; and Terry Gygar and Anthony Cassimatis, Butterworths 
Skills Series — Mooting Manual (1997) 2.
11 In the UK, see John Snape and Gary Watt, The Cavendish Guide to Mooting (2nd
ed, 2000) 7–12; and Gillespie, above n 1, 19–20. For the history of mooting in 
Australia, see Gygar and Cassimatis, above n 10, 1–3; and Andrew Lynch, ‘Why 
do we Moot? Exploring the Role of Mooting in Legal Education’ (1996) 7 Legal 
Education Review 67–70. On the history of mooting in the US, see Hernandez, 
above n 2, 75; Dickerson, above n 2, 1223; and Martineau, above n 8, 1294.
12 See Lynch, above n 11, 73.
13 Ibid 70.
14 There are actually some six or seven points in the list of ‘key features’ provided 
by Lynch. Each of them is discussed in more detail below. Perhaps the most 
signifi cant, when it comes to limiting the potential of a moot as a learning tool, is 
its focus on ‘points of law’.
15 See Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 2 (discussing the concept of the traditional 
moot). 
16 This is a fairly typical structure for a moot. On the position in Australia, see 
Lynch, above n 11, 70–1 (discussing the mooting programs at the University of 
Queensland, Griffi th University and Queensland University of Technology). In the 
US, see Dickerson, above n 2, 1220–1; Charles Chase McCarter, ‘Questions and 
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2 A judgment by a lower court. The judgment contains the fi ndings, 
reasoning and decision of the court (and also the alleged errors 
on which the appeal is based).
3 Selected grounds of appeal.17 The grounds of appeal are usually 
articulated in the moot problem. The grounds must be at least 
roughly divisible as students are generally required to work in 
teams of two (so two students ‘appear’ for each of the appellant 
and the respondent).18 They are usually responsible for deciding 
how to allocate the issues arising from the grounds of appeal.
Students are required to undertake the following tasks as if they 
were the advocates for one or sometimes both of the parties to the 
hypothetical problem. They must:19
1 research and prepare the case;
2 draft and submit a written outline of argument (or a ‘brief’ in US 
jurisdictions);
3 construct opposing arguments on the legal issues raised; and
4 present (and defend) those arguments before a simulated court.
Students are generally assessed on their court etiquette (that is, 
on their observance of ‘the conventional rules of behaviour’ of 
members of the legal profession towards each other and the court),20
their written and oral presentation skills with emphasis on the latter, 
the structure and quality of their arguments including demonstrated 
understanding of the applicable law, their knowledge and use of 
authority for the arguments presented, and their ability to answer 
questions from the bench.  
A moot is most often set in an appellate court21 and, frequently, 
in the court of last resort of a particular jurisdiction.22 It is diffi cult to 
Answers Regarding Moot Court’ (1982–83) 12 Stetson Law Review 759, 766–7; 
Frank Tuerkheimer, ‘A More Realistic Approach to Teaching Appellate Advocacy’ 
(1995) 45 Journal of Legal Education 113, 113. The same format is used in law 
schools in South Africa: see Pam Watson and Jonathan Klaaren, ‘An Exploratory 
Investigation into the Impact of Learning in Moot Court in the Legal Education 
Curriculum’ (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 548, 553.  
17 Gillespie, above n 1, 20; Snape and Watt, above n 11, 2.
18 Duncan Bentley, ‘Mooting in an Undergraduate Tax Program’ (1996) 7 Legal 
Education Review 98, 113. Some moots allow for three students to present for 
‘each side’. See, eg, the Australian Law Students Association moot and the ELSA 
World Trade Organization Law Moot. On the practice of splitting issues: see 
Kozinski, above n 3, 192. 
19 Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 16; Bentley, above n 18, 112–13. 
20 Thomson, above n 10, 463. 
21 The emphasis on appeal moots is found in law schools in all jurisdictions. In the 
UK, see A T H Smith (ed), Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (12th ed, 2002) 
194; Gillespie, above n 1, 20; Snape and Watt, above n 11, 20. In Australia, see 
Marlene Le Brun and Richard Johnstone, The Quiet Revolution — Improving 
Student Learning in Law (1994) 307; Gygar and Cassimatis, above n 10, 8; 
Bentley, above n 18, 113. The position is the same in law schools in the US and 
Canada: see William H Kenety, ‘Observations on Teaching Appellate Advocacy’ 
(1995) 45 Journal of Legal Education 582, 584; Tuerkheimer, above n 16, 113–14; 
Stuesser, above n 3, 126; Kozinski, above n 3, 178, 190; Hernandez, above n 2, 73; 
Martineau, above n 8, 1294; Dickerson, above n 2, 1218; Charles R Knerr, Andrew 
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fi nd satisfactory reasons why this is the case. It may have occurred 
because of the established practice of focusing arguments on points of 
law.23 Martineau suggests the reasons are mainly practical — appeals 
avoid the need for juries and witnesses, require less time, and are 
inexpensive as they need only minimal space and furniture.24
These practical reasons account in some measure for why moots 
are set in an appellate court rather than a trial court, but not for why 
moots are set in a superior, rather than an intermediate, court of 
appeal. Nor do these practicalities explain why an appeal is used as 
the setting for practice rather than other advocacy situations such 
as civil applications, pleas in mitigation of penalty and so on — all 
scenarios which would have precisely the same practical advantages 
as those claimed for the appellate moot.   
Martineau provides four possible educational reasons for 
focusing on appellate argument.25 First, students were thought to be 
familiar with appellate procedure because they read mainly appellate 
decisions in their law studies. Second, appeals were thought to 
involve primarily legal rather than factual issues, and legal education 
was more about law rather than facts. Third, legal education focused 
on developing legal reasoning and writing skills and there was more 
scope for this in an appeal than at a trial. Finally, that an appellate 
court has both written and oral submissions, allowing both forms of 
communication skills to be developed. I am not aware of any study 
that has tested the validity of these claims. In fact, based on available 
literature and on the experiences of mooting as it was conducted 
at Bond University Law School, it is suggested that the reasoning 
underlying the fi rst three claims is fl awed. As to the fourth claim, there 
are other advocacy tasks (for example, an interlocutory application) 
S Sommerman and Suzy K Rogers, ‘Undergraduate Moot Court in American 
Colleges and Universities’ (2008) 19 Journal of Legal Studies Education 27, 27–8. 
There are some exceptions: see, eg, the ELSA World Trade Organization moot, 
which is a fi rst instance case heard before a panel of trade law specialists; the 
Willem C Vis moot on international commercial arbitration, which is heard before 
an arbitral panel; the Philip C Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition 
and the Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Competition, both of which are before 
the ‘International Court of Justice’. While the list of exceptions may seem long, 
only a minority of students take part in these competitions.
22 In the UK, see Smith, above n 21, 194; Gillespie, above n 1, 20. In Australia, see 
Gygar and Cassimatis, above n 10, 15. In the US, see Kozinski, above n 3, 190; 
Gaubatz, above n 3, 88 (who notes that ‘programs tend to have an infatuation 
with the Supreme Court of the United States’); Kenety, above n 21, 582; Knerr, 
Sommerman and Rogers, above n 21, 30–32; Dickerson, above n 2, 1218 (although 
Dickerson points out that sometimes even the court and jurisdiction is fi ctitious; 
eg, the moot might be set before a hypothetical Supreme Court named after a law 
school).
23 This explanation is offered by Snape and Watt, above n 11, 20. They state that, 
‘[w]ith rare exceptions, a moot must take place in an appellate court because the 
mooters will be arguing points of law rather than questions of fact’. The exceptions 
to which they refer are ‘most international mooting competitions’. 
24 Martineau, above n 8, 1294–5.
25 Ibid 1294.
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which give students an opportunity to develop both written and oral 
communication skills in a far more realistic setting.
It has been suggested that the ability to argue on policy issues 
is one of the educational benefi ts of setting moots in an appellate 
court of last resort, rather than in an intermediate court of appeal. 
Students can submit policy arguments as to why the law should either 
remain as it is or be changed, since the court can depart from its own 
previous decisions.26 However, it is submitted later in the article that 
this feature of the traditional moot is actually a cause for concern, 
rather than a benefi t. Indeed, many of the causes for concern about 
the mooting experience follow from an overemphasis on appeals. 
These concerns are discussed in Part III.
C Objectives of Mooting
Mooting is often discussed as though it were a legal transaction 
or a legal skill;27 in fact, it is neither of these things. According to 
Mackie, legal work can be divided into progressively smaller units: 
legal transactions can be seen as a series of tasks, the performance 
of which requires the exercise of a collection of skills, while each 
skill may be broken down into a series of sub-skills.28 We can 
therefore speak of litigation as a transaction involving a number of 
tasks including advocacy, a task which requires the performance of a 
certain collection of skills including communication skills, which in 
turn can be broken down into sub-skills, such as the ability to speak 
clearly and the ability to ask appropriate questions. In the context of 
litigation, the task of the advocate is to persuade the decision-maker 
that the client’s cause ought to be successful. Mooting does not fi t 
into this scheme. It is not a legal transaction — no practising lawyer 
ever engages in a moot on behalf of a client. Neither is it a skill.
What then is a moot? It is ‘a specifi c form of simulation’,29 one 
which enables students to practise and develop a range of skills 
(although, as will be argued shortly, the objectives of mooting need 
not be limited to the development of skills) by performing them 
rather than just learning about them.30 The skills which feature most 
prominently in mooting, and which are interrelated, are those most 
commonly associated with advocacy: problem-solving; legal analysis 
26 Snape and Watt, above n 11, 20.
27 Graeme Broadbent, ‘Mooting: Big Event or Regular Occurrence?’ (Paper presented 
at the ALT Annual Conference, Durham, 2001) quoted in Gillespie, above n 1, 
22.
28 Karl Mackie, ‘Lawyer’s Skills: Educational Skills’ in Karl Mackie, Neil Gold and 
William Twining, Learning Lawyers Skills (1989) 11, 18.
29 Le Brun and Johnstone, above n 21, 307.
30 William M Sullivan et al, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of 
Law (2007) 145.
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and reasoning; legal research; written and oral communication; 
teamwork; time management; and strategy.31
These skills are not developed in isolation — they are exercised 
in relation to substantive content and in that process (when skills 
are brought to bear on content) learning of substantive law takes 
place. The question then arises — is the development of skills and 
substantive legal knowledge all that mooting can offer? It is submitted 
that mooting (and other experiential exercises) can be used to teach 
not only skills and law, but also values and ethics. Arguably, moots 
are not being used to achieve this objective at the present time.
In fact, in many respects, the ‘traditional moot’ makes limited 
use of the potential benefi ts of simulations and experiential learning. 
Its limitations are explored in the next part of the article under the 
heading ‘The Moot Problem’. The way in which we integrate moots 
into the curriculum is also important — some ways of integrating 
moots and other simulations are better than others for achieving their 
objectives. This second set of concerns is also explored in the next 
part of the article under the heading, ‘The Integration Challenge’.
III CONCERNS ABOUT MOOTING
A The Moot Problem
1  Lack of Opportunity to Develop Awareness of Ethics and 
Values
A number of major studies and reports into legal education and 
the legal profession emphasise the need to teach legal ethics, values 
and professional responsibility.32 Students may learn rules of court 
31 Gygar and Cassimatis, above n 10, 3–5; Dickerson, above n 2, 1218–19; Keyes 
and Whincop, above n 7, 16; Lynch, above n 11, 78; Gillespie, above n 1, 23; 
Hernandez, above n 2, 72; Knerr, Sommerman and Rogers, above n 21, 31–3; 
Watson and Klaaren, above n 16, 553.
32 In the US, see the recommendations of the American Bar Association, Section on 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and Professional 
Development — An Educational Continuum (Report of The Task Force on Law 
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992) 138–41 (the MacCrate 
Report); and, more recently, Roy Stuckey et al, Best Practices for Legal 
Education: A Vision and a Road Map (2007) 60–7 (the Stuckey Report). In the 
UK, see the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and 
Conduct, First Report on Legal Education and Training (1996) [1.19] and [2.4] 
(the ACLEC Report); Andrew Boon, ‘Ethics in Legal Education and Training: 
Four Reports, Three Jurisdictions and a Prospectus’ (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 34, 
56; Fiona Cownie, ‘Alternative Values in Legal Education’ (2003) 6 Legal Ethics
159, 171. In Australia, see the Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing 
Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report No 89 (2000) 
recommendation 2, ch 2 (the ALRC Report 89); Richard Johnstone and Sumitra 
Vignaendra, Learning Outcomes and Curriculum Development in Law: A Report 
Commissioned by the Australian Universities Teaching Committee (2003) 118. 
For a more general discussion on the need to teach ethics, values and professional 
responsibility in the law curriculum, see David Weisbrot, ‘Taking Skills Seriously: 
Reforming Australian Legal Education’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 266; 
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etiquette and perhaps some basic rules of professional conduct (for 
example, that they should not mislead or deceive the court) through 
mooting. However, in my experience, students often struggle with 
these rules, perhaps because they rarely receive explicit instruction 
about ethics until very late in their degree (most law schools teach 
legal ethics and professional conduct as a discrete, compulsory course 
towards the end of the degree). Thus, students need appropriate 
instruction on ethics at the time they are preparing for their fi rst 
moot.
But, in any event, legal ethics is not just about the rules of 
professional conduct.33 Students should be exposed to, and given 
opportunity to question, broader issues of professional responsibility 
such as those pertaining to:
•  the advocate’s role in the legal system and in society;
• the issue of who, in the lawyer–client relationship, chooses which 
issues to run and which to ignore;
• the question of whether or not an advocate needs to believe that 
justice is on the client’s side; and
• whether or not a court is the appropriate forum to resolve the 
matter at hand.
We also have an obligation to impart to our students a critical 
understanding of personal and professional values.34 Values are 
beliefs or principles of importance to an individual or group that 
serve as a yardstick by which an individual or group can evaluate 
alternative and sometimes confl icting courses of action.35 As stated 
in the Stuckey Report:
Among the values that we should include in our instructional design 
are the lawyer’s obligations to truth, honesty, and fair dealing; the 
responsibility to improve the integrity of the legal system within which 
Paul O’Shea, ‘The Complete Law School: Avoiding the Production of “Half-
Lawyers”’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 272.  
33 For a defi nition of ‘legal ethics teaching’, see June Chapman, ‘Why Teach Legal 
Ethics to Undergraduates?’ (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 68, 71. See also Lawrence 
S Krieger, ‘The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: 
Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness’ (2005) 11 Clinical Law Review
425, 436.
34 Eleanor W Myers, ‘Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with 
Theory and Practice’ (1997) 47 Journal of Legal Education 401, 408–10; Russell 
G Pearce, ‘MacCrate’s Missed Opportunity: The MacCrate Report’s Failure to 
Advance Professional Values’ (2002–2003) 23 Pace Law Review 575, 579; 
Richard A Matasar, ‘Skills and Values Education: Debate about the Continuum 
Continues’ (2002–2003) 46 New York Law School Law Review 395, 411; Bethany 
Rubin Henderson, ‘Asking the Lost Question: What is the Purpose of Law School?’ 
(2003) 53 Journal of Legal Education 48, 62–3. In particular, for a summary of 
relevant literature, see Roger Burridge and Julian Webb, ‘The Values of Common 
Law Legal Education: Rethinking Rules, Responsibilities, Relationships and 
Roles in the Law School’ (2007) 10 Legal Ethics 72, 90.
35 The Stuckey Report, above n 32, 31.
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the lawyer exercises the skills that are taught; the obligation to promote 
justice; and the obligation to provide competent representation.36
It is important for students to appreciate the potential for confl ict 
between competing values37 and the possibilities for dealing with it. 
They must also ‘engage their feelings’,38 and come to understand 
‘how ethics are undermined’ by time and peer pressures, stress, 
competition and personal values, such as loyalty to an employer and 
employment security.39
(a) How Should We Teach Skills, Ethics and Values?
How then can values best be taught within the law curriculum? 
Perhaps in the same way as skills are best taught — through 
incremental and integrated learning. An incremental approach allows 
time for the development and acquisition of skills ‘gradually by 
practice’.40 Ideally, students are introduced to a range of skills early 
in their studies and given multiple opportunities to practise those 
skills in increasingly complex situations as they progress through 
their degree. An integrated approach enables doctrinal instruction to 
be complemented by ‘lawyering courses’.41 Ideally, ‘this experience 
of complementarity’42 continues throughout the degree as skills 
are ‘taught in conscious relationship to the students’ growing 
understanding of particular features and areas of legal doctrine’.43
Similarly, ethics and values should be taught ‘pervasively and 
continuously’44 and incrementally across the law curriculum.45
Rhode most notably argues a case for teaching ethics by the 
pervasive method, to serve ‘not as a substitute for, but as a 
36 Ibid 125. For more on the values that we should include in our instructional design: 
see, eg, the MacCrate Report, above n 32, 140–1; the ACLEC Report, above
n 32, [1.21], [1.5], [2.4]; the Stuckey Report, above n 32, 60–1, 66–7; Pearce, 
above n 34, 579; Matasar, above n 34, 425; Adrian Evans and Josephine Palermo, 
‘Preparing Australia’s Future Lawyers: An Exposition of Changing Values over 
Time in the Context of Teaching about Ethical Dilemmas’ (2006) 11 Deakin Law 
Review 103, 109. 
37 On competing values, see Evans and Palermo, above n 36, 109.
38 Andrew Boon, ‘History is Past Politics: A Critique of the Legal Skills Movement 
in England and Wales’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society 151, 167.
39 Ibid.
40 Mackie, above n 28, 9.
41 Sullivan et al, above n 30, 195.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. Stuckey and his associates also emphasise the need to develop knowledge, 
skills and values progressively, sequentially and systematically: the Stuckey 
Report, above n 32, 69–70.
44 The Stuckey Report, above n 32, 74; Sullivan et al, above n 30, 126–61. In the UK, 
see Julian Webb, ‘Developing Ethical Lawyers: Can Legal Education Enhance 
Access to Justice?’ (1999) 33 The Law Teacher 284, 285–6. For the position in 
Australia, see G Villalta Puig, ‘Legal Ethics in Australian Law Schools’ (2008) 42 
The Law Teacher 29, 30.
45 Michael Robertson, ‘Challenges in the Design of Legal Ethics Learning Systems: 
An Educational Perspective’ (2005) 8 Legal Ethics 222, 237.
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supplement to separate coursework specifi cally focused on ethics’.46
As Rhode has stated, ‘[t]he primary rationale for addressing ethical 
issues throughout the curriculum is that they arise throughout the 
curriculum’.47 Additionally, if we teach legal ethics in context, we 
give students ‘a more realistic picture of how ethical issues arise and 
are addressed in legal practice’48 and assist them to see the relevance 
of ethical issues.49
There are, however, risks in teaching skills, values and ethics 
in an integrated, pervasive way. The quality of instruction is 
‘peculiarly vulnerable to the variable enthusiasm of teachers for its 
implementation’.50 This may result in superfi cial and inconsistent 
coverage of material. Some suggestions for overcoming these 
problems are offered in Part IV.
Assuming that a law school wants to use an incremental and 
integrated approach to teach skills, legal ethics and values, what 
then is the most appropriate method of delivery? Most law schools 
remain heavily dependent on large group lectures,51 supplemented 
in most instances by smaller group seminars and tutorials.52 While 
these are the primary methods used to impart knowledge, they are 
far from ideal when it comes to teaching and learning skills, ethics 
and values. To the extent that clinical education ‘enables students to 
integrate skills and theory with practice’53 and emphasises structured 
student experience and thoughtful feedback on that experience,54 it 
may be the most effective methodology for teaching these goals.55
46 Deborah L Rhodes, ‘Ethics by the Pervasive Method’ (1992) 42 Journal of Legal 
Education 31, 50. Also see O’Shea, above n 32, 272 who argues for the formal 
integration of ‘values’ and ‘ethics’ into the teaching of all the core ‘black letter’ 
subjects.
47 Rhodes, above n 46, 50.
48 Bruce A Green, ‘Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context’ (1997–1998) 39 
William & Mary Law Review 357, 360–1, 378–9.
49 Ibid 388; Alice M Noble-Allgire, ‘Desegregating the Law School Curriculum: 
How to Integrate More of the Skills and Values Identifi ed by the MacCrate Report 
into a Doctrinal Course’ (2002–2003) 3 Nevada Law Journal 32, 37.
50 Chapman, above n 33, 82.
51 The ‘large lecture method is once again favoured because of the pressure to 
transmit basic doctrine’:  Margaret Thornton, ‘The Idea of the University and the 
Contemporary Legal Academy’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 481, 486; Mary E 
Keyes and Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and 
Prospects for the Future’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 537, 552.
52 Even small group tutorials are threatened: Thornton, above n 51, 486; and Keyes 
and Johnstone, above n 51, 552.
53 Ross Hyams, ‘The Teaching of Skills: Rebuilding — Not Just Tinkering Around 
the Edges’ (1995) 13 Journal of Professional Legal Education 63, 71. 
54 Kathy Mack, ‘Bringing Clinical Learning into a Conventional Classroom’ (1993) 
4 Legal Education Review, 89, 91.
55 Boon notes that ‘[a]mong those addressing the issue of how to teach ethics there 
is almost universal agreement that clinical courses provide the most effective 
vehicle’: Boon, above n 32, 60. For more on the potential benefi ts of clinic and 
simulation courses, see, generally, Roy Stuckey, ‘Teaching with Purpose: Defi ning 
and Achieving Desired Outcomes in Clinical Law Courses’ (2006–2007) 13 
Clinical Law Review 807, 827.
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However, only a minority of law schools offer clinical courses and 
those that do offer the opportunity on an optional basis to a minority 
of students.56 Financial constraints impact the ability of many schools 
to offer clinic courses, and therefore our best hope for the future 
rests with simulations and other experiential learning activities. It is 
essential then that we use them effectively. 
(b) Experiential Learning and Effective Use of Simulations
Experiential education or learning is defi ned as learning by 
‘doing, refl ecting, applying and evaluating’.57 It is essential for 
developing skills and an understanding of, and appreciation for, 
ethical standards, social roles and the responsibilities that mark 
the profession.58 David Kolb describes experiential learning as a 
‘sequential, recurring four-stage cycle’59 consisting of concrete 
experience; refl ective observation (collecting information through 
analysis of the cognitive, performative and affective aspects of the 
experience); abstract conceptualisation (organising the information 
into a theoretical framework and drawing out general principles for 
future use); and active experimentation (testing the generalisations 
in new situations) which leads the learner back to concrete 
experience.60
A sequence of activities appropriate for teaching skills and relevant 
ethics and values, commencing at the abstract conceptualisation 
stage, is as follows.
1 Preparing for experience: before practising a skill, students 
receive instruction in the theory relating to the skill.61 Theory 
56 See, eg, statistics given by Boon, above n 32, 63. This is also the case in Australian 
law schools where Robertson predicts that clinics ‘will continue to be rationed into 
the foreseeable future’: above n 45, 233. For further information on the position in 
Australia (and the resource problems associated with clinical courses), see Lyndal 
Taylor, ‘Skills Skills — Kind Inclusion and Learning in Law School’ (2001) 3 
University of Technology, Sydney Law Review <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
journals/UTSLRev/2001> at 23 December 2009.  
57 Richard Grimes, ‘The Theory and Practice of Clinical Legal Education’ in Julian 
Webb and Caroline Maughan (eds), Teaching Lawyers’ Skills (1996) 142.
58 Stuckey, above n 55, 809–10, 812; Sullivan et al, above n 30, 28; and the Stuckey 
Report, above n 32, 133.
59 David Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and 
Development (1984) 20–1. Kolb’s model builds on the work of earlier educational 
theorists: see Caroline Maughan, ‘Learning How to Learn: The Skills Developer’s 
Guide to Experiential Learning’ in Webb and Maughan, above n 57, 70; Ron 
Downs, ‘Experiential Learning: In a Practical Legal Training Course’ (1989) 7 
Journal Of Professional Legal Education 141, 142–4; Graham Gibbs, Learning 
By Doing: A Guide to Teaching and Learning Methods (1988) 9.
60 For an overview of Kolb’s four stage experiential learning model, see Gibbs, 
above n 59, 40; Maughan, above n 59, 63–4, 70–1. For more detailed discussion 
on experiential learning, see Susan W Weil and Ian McGill (eds), Making Sense 
of Experiential Learning: Diversity in Theory and Practice (1989) 12; David 
Boud, Rosemary Keogh and David Walker (eds), What is Refl ection in Learning, 
Introduction to Refl ection: Turning Experience into Learning (1985) 12–13.
61 The term ‘theory’ as used here refers to the concepts and categories that individuals 
use to predict, explain, and extract information from episodes of experience in a 
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is then linked with behavioural practice by demonstrations and 
modelling of the elements of effective performance.
2 Providing substitute experiences with simulations: students are 
given the opportunity to practise the skill in simulations and 
other experiential exercises. As an alternative to the instruction–
demonstrate/practice sequence, students might fi rst attempt 
performance and then extract a model from their practice.62
3 Reviewing and refl ecting on experience through assessment and 
feedback: student performance is then formatively assessed. 
Ideally, students are provided with written assessment criteria63
and individualised feedback on their performance64 that they can 
use to refl ect on their experience and plan for improvement.65
This is followed by further teaching66 and assessment.67
4 Providing opportunity for further practice in subsequent 
assessment activities: students are then provided with the 
opportunity to test new ideas and to transfer their learning to 
new situations, with further practice. It is preferable for student 
practice at this stage to be assessed again and for students to 
receive further feedback.68
Simulations are an integral part of experiential learning. They can 
stimulate a deep approach to the learning of law in both its theoretical 
and practical dimensions.69 They can encourage students to take 
responsibility for their own learning,70 fostering skills needed for the 
transfer of learning and for lifelong learning.71 They can enhance 
systematic way: Gary L Blasi, ‘Teaching Lawyering as an Intellectual Project’ 
(1996) 14 Journal of Professional Legal Education 65, 68. There are a multiplicity 
of theories that inform skilled behaviour and a variety of perspectives from which 
it can be examined (eg, professional, ethical or social justice contexts): Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, ‘Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing 
from the MacCrate Report — Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being’ 
(1994) 69 Washington Law Review 593, 609–10.
62 Mackie, above n 28, 20.
63 Richard Johnstone, Jenny Paterson and Kim Rubenstein, Improving Criteria and 
Feedback in Student Assessment in Law (1998) 6–7; Mackie, above n 28, 17; 
Gibbs, above n 59, 28.
64 Gibbs, above n 59, 51; Derek Rowntree, Assessing Students: How Shall We Know 
Them? (2nd ed, 1987) 26. Generally, on the characteristics of effective feedback: 
see Maughan, above n 59, 87–9; Johnstone, Paterson and Rubenstein, above n 63, 
39–41.
65 For a detailed explanation of the process of refl ection, see Gibbs, above n 59, 40; 
Caroline Maughan and Julian Webb, ‘Taking Refl ection Seriously: How Was it 
for Us?’ in Webb and Maughan, above n 57, 261; see generally, Boud, Keogh and 
Walker, above n 60.
66 Rowntree, above n 64, 122.
67 Ibid 200.
68 Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 10–11; Rowntree, above n 64, 200.
69 Jay M Feinman, ‘Simulations: An Introduction’ (1995) 45 Journal of Legal 
Education 469, 471. This is one of the reasons that skills are so often taught in 
conjunction with substantive law courses.  
70 Julian Webb, ‘Why Theory Matters’ in Webb and Maughan, above n 57, 44; the 
Stuckey Report, above n 32, 133.
71 David A Binder and Paul Bergman, ‘Taking Lawyering Skills Training Seriously’ 
(2003) 10 Clinical Law Review 191, 215. 
Legal Education Review, Vol. 19 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://epublications.bond.edu.au/ler/vol19/iss1/3
 BEYOND MOOTING 53
student motivation to learn,72 providing them ‘with a sense of the 
relevance of their law school training to what they will be doing as 
lawyers.’73 Simulations can also provide a realistic (but controlled) 
context for students to explore the relationship between lawyer 
and client, to experience the ethical dimensions of practice, and to 
consider issues of professional responsibility.74
However, the potential educational value of simulations can only 
be fully realised if the following conditions are met:
1 Simulations should ‘replicate actual practice’75 or ‘approximate 
reality’.76 By defi nition, a simulation ‘puts a learner into a 
situation that closely approximates what might be experienced 
in the practice of a profession and requires him or her to react in 
an appropriate fashion.’77
2 Simulations should be perceived by students to be relevant, 
meaningful and interesting.78 Students are more likely to 
perceive simulations in this light if the tasks they are required 
to undertake resemble those that might confront a practising 
lawyer. If possible, new experiences should be linked to the 
existing experience of students.
3 The tasks that are set for students should be achievable in the 
sense that students have ‘a reasonable expectation of success’.79
Ideally, students are given the opportunity to master simple tasks 
before being required to undertake complex tasks — a process 
referred to as scaffolding.80
72 Ibid.
73 Paul J Spiegelman, ‘Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School 
Curriculum: The Logic of Jake’s Ladder in the Context of Amy’s Web’ (1988) 38 
Journal of Legal Education 243, 260.
74 Sullivan et al, above n 30, 158–9. See the Stuckey Report, above n 32, 135 for 
objectives that can be achieved through use of simulation-based courses. Also see 
Myers, above n 34, 401.
75 The Stuckey Report, above n 32, 133.
76 For defi nitions and discussion of the potential educational value of simulations, see 
Robyn M Duncan, ‘Teaching Legal Skills for Transfer of Learning: Is Simulation 
the Answer?’(1984) 2 Journal of Professional Legal Education 64, 68; Russell 
Stewart, ‘Making Simulating Stimulating’ (1985) 3 Journal of Professional 
Legal Education 51, 53; Spiegelman, above n 73, 263; Robert Park, ‘Appropriate 
Methods for the Teaching of Legal Skills in Practical Training Courses’ (1990) 8 
Journal of Professional Legal Education 161, 175–6; Feinman, above n 69, 470.
77 Cyril O Houle, Continuing Learning in the Professions (1980) 220, quoted in 
Stewart, above n 76, 51; Binder and Bergman, above n 71, 215. See also Stuckey 
on the importance of having students perform ‘the tasks that lawyers perform’: 
Stuckey, above n 55, 816.
78 John B Biggs, ‘Teaching for Better Learning’ (1990–1991) 2 Legal Education 
Review 133, 142; Mackie, above n 28, 15. Kift confi rms that it is ‘the learner’s 
conception of future practice’ which is important: Sally Kift, ‘Lawyering Skills: 
Finding their Place in Legal Education’ (1997) 8 Legal Education Review 43, 58.
79 Biggs, above n 78, 142.
80 David A Binder, Albert J Moore and Paul Bergman, ‘A Dispositions Course: 
Tackling the Challenge of Teaching for Professional Skills Transfer’ (2006–2007) 
13 Clinical Law Review 871, 886.
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4 Students should be required to undertake practice in different 
settings and on varied topics. A diversity of tasks is needed.81
In their current form, moots may fail to meet these conditions. They 
do not give students adequate opportunity to experience the ethical 
and professional dimensions of practice. If they take the traditional 
format, students will not be exposed to diversity in practice, as 
one moot differs very little from the next. There is also evidence 
that students fi nd the mooting experience to be unrealistic and 
overwhelming. 
In the next part of the article, I discuss a number of concerns 
that have been raised about mooting. In most instances, I rely upon 
observations of mooting as it was conducted at the Bond University 
Law School (where that is the case, Bond Law School is specifi cally 
mentioned). In every instant, the same problem has been raised by 
one or more commentators observing moots at law schools in the 
US. In the latter case, all observations were made of mooting in its 
traditional format. It is diffi cult to assess the extent of these problems 
in other law schools in Australia. As far as I am aware, there have 
been four major articles published on mooting in this country.82
Only one of them directly addresses weaknesses in our mooting 
programs.83
2 Overemphasis on Appellate Moots
It is submitted that many of the assumptions underlying the 
reasons why law schools use appellate moots are fl awed. The focus on 
appellate level oral argument has been repeatedly fl agged as a cause 
for concern. The problems associated with traditional mooting were 
observed fi rst hand at Bond University School of Law which operated 
a traditional mooting program from the time of its inception in 1989 
to 1996. Moots were a required component in three compulsory 
substantive law courses. Typically, students undertook their fi rst 
moot in their fi rst semester. In each moot, students were required to 
argue contentious points of law by way of appeal before a simulated 
81 Mackie, above n 28, 17, 19.
82 Lynch, above n 11 (describing the mooting programs at University of Queensland, 
Queensland University of Technology and Griffi th University Law Schools); 
Keyes and Whincop, above n 7 (critiquing the traditional moot); Bentley, above n 
18 (describing the use of moots in an elective tax law course at Bond University 
Law School); and, most recently, Butler and Mansted, above n 2 (describing a 
new appellate advocacy and mooting elective at Bond University Law School). 
Reference can also be made to a number of mooting manuals (eg, Gygar and 
Cassimatis, above n 10) and to more general literature on skills teaching and 
learning which addresses mooting, but only in passing.
83 See Keyes and Whincop, whose main concern was the lack of formative feedback 
in traditional mooting: Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 15. They propose ‘the 
formative moot’ as an alternative procedure. The only other potentially negative 
comment about moots in Australia is raised in the research conducted by 
Lynch, who found that students experienced a great deal of stress (and terror) in 
undertaking moots: Lynch, above n 11, 88. 
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court, typically a court of last resort. A number of problems were 
observed when the program was evaluated in 1996–97, as discussed 
below.84
(a) Lack of Familiarity with Appellate Procedure
It can be a mistake to assume that students have a familiarity with 
appellate procedure, especially in the fi rst year of their law degree 
program. Even when students have covered the basics of court 
procedure (as they might do in an introductory law course) they may 
not necessarily connect this knowledge with what they are required 
to do in a moot; that is, students might not make the connection 
between theory and practice unless the connection is made explicit. 
This problem may be overcome with better integration of moots, 
both later in the degree program and in the context of relevant 
substantive law courses. It is considered below in more detail as one 
of the challenges of integration.
(b) Ignoring the Facts
It is a mistake to assume that the law (and legal education) is 
concerned primarily with legal issues although that may be the 
impression given to students when only appellate moots are used. 
The facts have been funnelled at appellate level. They are fi xed and 
predetermined.85 This limited and sterile treatment of facts can have 
several consequences. It may:
1 give students the impression that facts in real life are defi ned, 
concrete and knowable rather than uncertain, slippery and 
complex;86
2 encourage students to take a narrow view of the relevance of 
facts in the operation and practice of the law. Many students 
at Bond University School of Law applied the law in a factual 
vacuum — without reference to the facts in the problem or the 
problems of the individuals concerned. We did not teach the 
lesson that ‘the facts make the issues truly understandable’;87
and
84 During this period, the author and at least one other member of faculty observed 
student performances in 20 moots each semester for six successive semesters 
(making a total of 120 moots). The same faculty members examined supporting 
documentation prepared by students for their moots and observed the debriefi ng 
sessions conducted by assessors and students after each moot. At the completion 
of the course containing moots, students were required to complete an evaluation 
form pertaining to the moot exercise. Originals of all documentation are on fi le 
with the author.
85 Gygar and Cassimatis, above n 10, 5.
86 Duncan notes that we live in a factually-ambiguous world characterised by 
uncertainty and value-confl icts: Nigel Duncan, ‘The Skill of Learning: Implications 
of the ACLEC First Report for Teaching Skills on Undergraduate Law Courses’ 
(1997) 5 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1, 4. 
87 Gaubatz, above n 3, 99.
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3 give students little opportunity to sort relevant facts from the 
irrelevant; to identify facts that are ‘missing’; to collect and 
construct facts, and to select and organise them. Students at 
Bond University experienced diffi culty integrating facts into 
their argument. They failed to use positive facts in the problem 
before them to highlight the merit of their client’s case and to 
acknowledge or explain adverse facts. These are all critical skills 
for lawyers and should be nurtured and developed. 
These problems might be attributed to a poorly drafted moot problem 
or to a poorly prepared student cohort at Bond University except that 
the same problems have been mentioned in literature published in 
the US. For instance, Kozinski argues that we teach students that 
‘facts don’t matter on appeal, because that’s where you argue law’;88
Kenety maintains that the typical moot problem ‘does not require the 
sorting or mastering of facts’;89 while Martineau simply argues that 
appellate moots fail to emphasise the signifi cance of facts.90 Moots, if 
restricted to appeals, cannot offer the same fl exibility or opportunity 
for handling facts as might be offered with say, an interlocutory 
application.
Duncan suggests that, in order to make real the context in which the 
law operates and to give students the scope to explore the ambiguity 
of ‘facts’, we need to provide students with ‘problems where the 
facts are slippery (containing confl ict and ambiguity), not given’;91
where people give contradictory accounts of an event and where 
there are variations in evidence. In addition to giving a more realistic 
view of the world and affording students the opportunity to use facts 
constructively, simulations based on varying accounts of events and 
factual gaps and uncertainties also give students the ‘opportunity 
to explore the ethical dimensions of practice’.92 Of course, there is 
hardly universal agreement that universities should be focused on 
preparing students for practice. University law schools have multiple 
interest groups, missions and emphases.93 Yet, despite the diversity, 
there is wide agreement that one of the goals of undergraduate legal 
education is ‘to introduce students to basic competencies required 
88 See Kozinski, above n 3, 188 (he attributes the problem directly to the format of 
the moot). Also see Gaubatz, above n 3, 99; and Hernandez who notes that moots 
‘commonly focus primarily, if not exclusively, on pure issues of law’: Hernandez, 
above n 2, 73.
89 Kenety, above n 21, 582.
90 Martineau, above n 8, 1297.
91 Duncan, above n 86, 4.
92 Ibid 5.
93 See, eg, Cownie, above n 32, 161 (where she notes that there are many views on 
the proper nature and purpose of the university law school). Also see the Stuckey 
Report, above n 32, 28; Sullivan et al, above n 30, 13; Andras Jakab, ‘Dilemmas of 
Legal Education: A Comparative Overview’ (2007) 57 Journal of Legal Education
253, 264 (where the author concludes that different countries have adopted 
different solutions to the issues of goals, content and methodologies).
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in legal practice.’94 There is also wide agreement that law programs 
should include a mix of knowledge, skills, ethics and values.95
There are several advocacy contexts in which contradiction and 
uncertainty in facts can easily be introduced, without having to go 
into the practical diffi culties involved in a trial — for example, pleas 
in mitigation of penalty and interlocutory applications.
(c)  Limited Opportunity to Develop Skills in Legal Reasoning, 
Analysis and Writing
One of the benefi ts claimed for mooting (and, in particular, for 
appellate mooting) is that it allows students to develop skills of 
legal reasoning, analysis and writing. However, several features of 
the traditional moot format may unnecessarily limit the opportunity 
students have to develop these skills sets. Relevant features are 
discussed below.
Students are rarely required to identify and formulate the grounds 
of appeal themselves. In most moot programs, the author of the 
moot problem formulates the grounds of appeal. This was the case 
at Bond University Law School. We discovered that many students 
failed to identify and address errors in the decision of the lower court 
(when acting for the appellant) or to demonstrate that the appellant’s 
allegations of error were ill founded (when acting for the respondent). 
Occasionally, students made no reference to the decision, reasoning 
or fi ndings of the lower court. There is, it is submitted, some causal 
connection between these problems and the fact that students were 
supplied with grounds of appeal. Students are less likely to focus on 
‘errors’ and the error-correcting function of appellate courts, when 
they are not charged with the task of identifying errors. Students are 
also less likely to go back to the judgment and to distil the reasoning 
used by the judge. In short, they are less likely to see how and why 
the judge got the decision right or wrong. Why deny students ‘the 
real lawyer’s problems of issue spotting and record combing’?96
Gaubatz, Martineau and Kozinski all observe that pre-occupation 
with appellate court moots encourages students to over-rely on 
policy arguments,97 while not allowing them an opportunity to 
appreciate the use of authority in lower courts.98 They argue that 
94 Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 13. Also see Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don 
Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth 
Tertiary Education Commission (1987) 58; John de Groot, ‘Acquiring Basic Legal 
Skills and Knowledge: What and Where?’ (1994) 12 Journal of Professional Legal 
Education 1, 1; William Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline (1997) 
194; Wade, above n 8, 175; John Goldring, ‘The Future of Legal Education: 
Why? And How? Doubtful Assumptions and Unfulfi lled Expectations’ (1993) 11 
Journal of Professional Legal Education 149, 150. For more general discussion on 
the purposes of law school, see Taylor, above n 56.
95 See references above notes 32–43.
96 Gaubatz, above n 3, 88.
97 Ibid; Martineau, above n 8, 1297; Kozinski, above n 3, 191.
98 Gaubatz, above n 3, 88. 
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it avoids the need and the more challenging task of dealing, as 
inferior courts must, with binding authority.99 Martineau observed 
students routinely ignoring the error-correcting function served by 
intermediate appellate courts.100 Kozinski claims that students do 
not develop the ability to rely on authority when favourable; or to 
distinguish it when it is adverse to their case. He claims that moot 
court teaches ‘students the wrong lesson that policy, not law, plays 
the key role in arguments in most of the courts where they will 
appear’.101 Students in the moot program at Bond University Law 
School experienced the same problems. Their focus was not on case 
analysis but on fl oodgates and appeals to justice writ large. 
The written aspect of advocacy is often down-played for its oral 
component.102 In all the moots at Bond University Law School, 
students were required to prepare and hand up a written summary 
of their argument. However, little, if any, specifi c feedback was 
given to students in relation to their summaries. The emphasis 
was on the oral component of the moot over written argument. 
Understandably, students in our program gave written summaries 
only cursory attention103 and perceived them to be incidental to 
their main performance — the oral presentation. This is apparently 
a common problem. Kozinski refers to ‘the overemphasis of oral 
argument over brief-writing’ as ‘one of moot court’s most notorious 
shortcomings’.104 This overemphasis creates a number of problems.
First, students are not given suffi cient opportunity to develop 
sound writing skills. We discovered a range of common errors in 
written ‘Summaries of Argument’ in the Bond University moot 
program, including incomplete or superfi cial coverage of issues, 
absence of, or incorrect, statements of legal principle, and fl awed 
structure in arguments. 
Second, in downplaying the importance of written argument, 
we ignored two aspects of the reality of advocacy practice: the role 
played by writing in preparation for an appearance and the role 
played by writing in persuading the court to a client’s cause. Careful 
 99 Kozinski, above n 3, 191. 
100 Martineau, above n 8, 1297.
101 Kozinski, above n 3, 192.
102 It is acknowledged that some international mooting competitions place heavy 
emphasis on written submissions or memorials. However, this is not normally the 
case with moots that take place within the curriculum. On the lack of emphasis 
given to the written component of traditional moots in law schools in Australia, 
see Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 21–2. In the US, see Kenety, above n 21, 
584; Kozinski, above n 3, 186; Hernandez, above n 2, 80, all of whom argue that 
insuffi cient attention is given to written argument.
103 There is a direct relationship between assessment, motivation and positive 
learning outcomes: see Johnstone, Paterson and Rubenstein, above n 63, 7–8; 
Rowntree, above n 64, 22. Keyes and Whincop also observe that students have 
little motivation to develop written skills when the traditional moot format is used: 
Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 21.
104 Kozinski, above n 3, 186. 
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writing of submissions prepares an advocate to deliver a persuasive 
and convincing argument in court. It forces an advocate to exercise 
selectivity in choosing issues, to develop arguments logically and 
sequentially, and to consider their choice of language carefully. And 
today, more so than ever before, written submissions ‘are as much 
exercises in advocacy as the oral argument.’105 In fact, in practice, 
there is increasing reliance placed on written submissions and limits 
imposed on the duration of oral presentations.106 Written submissions 
are the fi rst, and perhaps the primary, tool of persuasion.
(d) Lack of Realism
Perhaps the most often-raised criticism about mooting is that 
the emphasis on appeals does not refl ect the reality of practice.107
Few advocates will undertake appellate work in their early years of 
practice. Fewer still will appear before the High Court of Australia or 
its equivalent in other jurisdictions.108 Appearances on interlocutory 
applications, guilty pleas together with submissions in mitigation of 
penalty, and perhaps some trial work in the lower courts, make up 
the fi rst years in practice as an advocate. Students are well aware of 
these practice trends. Bond law students who completed evaluation 
forms in the fi rst review of the program conducted in 1996–97 made 
the following remarks when asked to comment on changes that they 
would like to see made to the mooting program:
• Greater emphasis on mooting at Magistrates’ Court level.
• Shift of focus to the lower courts, as young lawyers very rarely get to 
do appellate court work.
• More opportunity to practise litigation skills (particularly those 
relevant to lower courts).109
There is also a valid, though separate, argument that appeal moots 
do not refl ect the realities of appellate court practice; for example, 
by placing too much emphasis on oral submissions and policy 
105 Lord Alexander of Weedon, ‘The Art of Advocacy’ (1991) 9 Bar News — The 
Journal of the New South Wales Bar Association 14, 14. Generally, on the role and 
importance of written submissions, see James L Glissan, Advocacy in Practice
(2005) 195.
106 This trend is likely to continue: see Justice Michael D Kirby, ‘Ten Rules of 
Appellate Advocacy’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 974, 975; David F 
Jackson, ‘Practice in the High Court of Australia’ (1996–1997) 15 Australian Bar 
Review 187, 198.
107 See, eg, Gaubatz, above n 3, 87; Martineau, above n 8, 1297; Stuesser, above n 3, 
126.
108 For relevant statistics on the number of appeals to the High Court of Australia, see 
Jackson, ‘Practice in the High Court of Australia’, above n 106, 197–8. Gillespie 
agrees that it could be many years before a barrister appears before the Court of 
Appeal and much longer still before they appear before the House of Lords in the 
UK: Gillespie, above n 1, 20. 
109 Bond University School of Law’s Student Evaluation Forms of substantive courses 
containing moots taught in the period 1996–97.
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arguments.110 In order to meet the need for realism and relevance, 
a change in the moot itself is required or other simulations need 
to be substituted. The second course of action may meet with less 
resistance from academic staff. For some authors and educators, 
mooting has become synonymous with appellate advocacy and they 
may be reluctant to alter the traditional moot format.111
B The Integration Challenge
1 Mooting at Law Schools in the United Kingdom
The most recent research on mooting concerns the approach 
taken by law schools in the UK.112 In a study conducted in 2006,113
Gillespie and Watt found that the most popular way in which moots 
are integrated into the law curriculum in the UK (a total of 71 per cent 
of the modules where moots are used) is as part of a discrete module 
(a skills module or a mooting module) unattached to substantive law 
courses. Moots are attached to substantive law courses in only 22 per 
cent of cases (and, according to Gillespie, this may occur by default 
rather than by planning or specifi c design).114 Gillespie argues, on 
the basis of these fi ndings, that law schools in the UK see mooting 
as a vehicle predominantly for legal skills development rather than 
substantive law, a matter of concern to him. 
Gillespie’s second major concern was about the way in which 
moots are assessed. He and Watt found that, in 83 per cent of modules 
where mooting was included in the curriculum, the moot was 
summatively assessed; that is, it was used for the purpose of giving 
students a grade,115 rather than for providing formative feedback on 
their learning of substantive law and skills.116 Typically, students 
are given the opportunity to participate in only a single moot. They 
are not given feedback which can be used to improve subsequent 
performance in a second moot.117
110 Kenety, above n 21, 582–4; Tuerkheimer, above n 16, 113–15; Kozinski, above n 
3, 178, 190.
111 For example, Dickerson states that ‘[m]oot court is an activity in which students 
practice appellate advocacy skills’: Dickerson, above n 2, 1218; while Gygar and 
Cassimatis use the phrases ‘university mooting program’ and ‘university appellate 
advocacy program’ interchangeably: Gygar and Cassimatis, above n 10, 6. 
112 Gillespie, above n 1, 19.
113 Alisdair A Gillespie and Gary Watt, Mooting for Learning (2006) UK Centre for 
Legal Education <http://www.ukcle.ac.uk/research/projects/gillespie2.html> at 
23 December 2009. Unfortunately, Gillespie and Watt did not ask institutions to 
indicate whether or not mooting was compulsory; nor did they ask them to indicate 
how mooting competitions were accommodated within the curriculum, if at all.
114 Gillespie, above n 1, 22.
115 The results of the survey do not indicate whether students are given a pass/fail 
grade or ranked.
116  Gillespie, above n 1, 32–4; Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 18.
117 Gillespie, above n 1, 33–4.
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It is suggested that the two major concerns mentioned by 
Gillespie arise because of the way in which moots are integrated 
into the curriculum. They are best considered to be challenges of 
integration rather than as problems intrinsic to the moot.
Gillespie and Watt also found that the majority of the mooting 
(56 per cent) that takes place as part of the curriculum occurs in 
the fi rst year of the undergraduate law program.118 This led Gillespie 
to raise two additional concerns; namely, that the skills involved in 
moots were too advanced for fi rst-year students and that no provision 
had been made for the incremental development of these skills. It is 
suggested that these concerns are a product of the nature of the moot 
and the way in which they are integrated. Consideration of these 
concerns is thus deferred, to be dealt with under the heading ‘other 
concerns’. 
2 Mooting at Law Schools in Australia and the United States
In Australia, moots are offered within the curriculum in virtually 
all law schools. They may be offered, on either a compulsory or 
elective basis, as: 
1 a component of a discrete skills module or mooting module. 
Where the moot is part of a skills course, that course is most 
often a fi rst-year research and writing course. Where mooting is 
offered as an elective, it is often a limited enrolment later-year 
elective;
2 a required component of substantive law courses; or
3 an optional form of assessment in a substantive law course.119
In all of these models, the moots are assessed.
In Australia, the most common way in which moots are 
incorporated into the curriculum is as electives. As explained shortly, 
many moot competitions are accommodated within the curriculum 
in this manner.
Similar trends are evident in the US, where mooting takes place:
1 ‘typically’ as part of compulsory fi rst-year legal research and 
writing courses;120
2 occasionally, as either a compulsory or optional part of 
substantive law courses; or
118 Ibid 27.
119 These results are based on a survey of the course requirements, course offerings 
and newsletters published by university law schools in Australia (viewed at 
11 October 2008), and on published literature such as the stocktake of legal 
education conducted by Johnstone and Vignaendra, above n 32, 133-55; Gygar 
and Cassimatis, above n 10, 129; Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 16; and Lynch, 
above n 11, 72.
120 Lucia A Silecchia, ‘Legal Skills Training in the First Year of Law School: 
Research? Writing? Analysis? Or More?’ (1996) 100 Dickinson Law Review 245, 
249; Gaubatz, above n 3, 90; McCarter, above n 16, 759; Martineau, above n 8, 
1295; Dickerson, above n 2, 1218.
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3  as limited enrolment ‘upper-level electives’.121 Some competitions 
are incorporated into the curriculum by way of elective.
The fi rst model appears to predominate in the US although 
incorporation of moots by way of upper-year electives and moot 
competitions is also popular.122
All law schools in Australia offer students an opportunity to 
participate in moot competitions. At some universities, this may be 
the only way in which students can participate in moots. Competitions 
may be intra-school, interschool, regional or state, interstate, national 
and international. The majority of the competitions are purely extra-
curricular in nature and not assessed, but some of them — the major 
international competitions — are treated as electives, and students 
who successfully obtain one of the limited spots on the moot teams 
in these competitions are given credit and awarded a grade as for any 
other course.123
Some of the models of integration mentioned above are more 
effective than others for achieving specifi ed objectives — these 
are covered in the following discussion. To the extent that moot 
competitions are ‘integrated’ into the curriculum as electives, the 
analysis includes moot competitions. 
3 Mooting as a Discrete Module — Too Little Law?
When moots are offered as part of discrete skills modules or 
mooting modules,124 although they are based on substantive law, 
they are usually not linked to particular substantive law courses (and, 
in some programs, they may not be confi ned to one substantive law 
area). Students may be required to argue a case in areas of law that 
they have not specifi cally studied. Consequently, the moots are not 
necessarily designed to further substantive law objectives. In one 
Australian school, using this model, mooting is viewed as a way to 
‘develop students’ research and advocacy skills not as a means for 
students to learn a specifi c area of substantive law’.125 This model 
has its supporters who claim that the experience is realistic to the 
extent that legal practitioners may be faced with problems involving 
121 Silecchia, above n 120, 249. Generally, for a discussion of the position in law 
schools in the US, see Knerr, Sommerman and Rogers, above n 21, 27; and 
Dickerson, above n 2, 1218. On skills teaching generally in US law schools: see 
Sullivan et al, above n 30, 87–8. 
122 Dickerson, above n 2, 1223; Knerr, Sommerman and Rogers, above n 21, app.
123 This appears to be a fairly common way for schools to accommodate major 
mooting competitions within the curriculum: see references above n 119. The 
competitions in this category include the Philip C Jessup International Law Moot 
Court Competition, the ELSA Moot Competition on WTO Law, the Willem C Vis 
International Commercial Arbitration Moot, and the International Maritime Law 
Arbitration Moot Competition.
124 The fi rst model has been used for many years at the University of Queensland, 
Australia.
125 Lynch, above n 11, 73.
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overlapping substantive and procedural points some or all of which 
are new to them.126 However, this is also the model which led Gillespie 
to assert that moots were being used ‘merely’ for the development 
of skills.127 I disagree. It is submitted that while this particular model 
of integration is not the optimal way to facilitate students attaining 
substantive law and skill objectives, a moot is always more than a 
vehicle for the development of skills, no matter how it is integrated. 
As maintained in the discussion about the objectives of moots, skills 
and theory are inextricably linked, and an appropriately crafted 
simulation is never limited to skills. This claim will be elaborated 
upon below.
4  Mooting as a Component of Substantive Law Courses —
Theory and Practice Reinforced
When moots are a component of substantive law courses,128
the skills involved can be consciously and explicitly taught in 
combination with, and in the context of, relevant substantive law. 
It is an ideal approach to integration, one that is premised on the 
principle that theory and practice are complementary and most 
effectively learned together.129 Literature, old and new, supports the 
teaching and learning of skills in the context of substantive law.130
The learning of relevant skills can encourage students to adopt a 
deep approach to theoretical learning and so enhance their learning 
of substantive law.131 An understanding of theory is necessary for 
students to apply and refl ect upon the application of skills.132 In a 
practical sense, skills and substantive components can be designed 
to ‘feed off each other while achieving their own objectives and 
learning outcomes’.133
126 Gygar and Cassimatis, above n 10, 128–9; Lynch, above n 11, 72–3.
127 Gillespie, above n 1, 35.
128 Both Griffi th University Law School and Bond University Law School use this 
model.
129 William Twining, ‘Preparing Lawyers for the Twenty-First Century’ (1992) 3 
Legal Education Review 1, 2.
130 For example, the authors of the Stuckey report urge us to develop a program of 
instruction which integrates the teaching of theory, doctrine and practice: see the 
Stuckey Report, above n 32, 71.
131 Stuesser, above n 3, 119; Lynch, above n 11, 91, 93; Noel Jackling, ‘Academic 
and Practical Legal Education: Where Next?’ (1986) 4 Journal of Professional 
Legal Education 1, 4; Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 34. Generally, on deep, 
achieving and surface approaches to learning, see Biggs, above n 78, 138–40; 
Gordon Joughin and David Gardiner, A Framework for Teaching and Learning 
Law (1996) 5.
132 Susan L DeJarnatt, ‘In re MacCrate: Using Consumer Bankruptcy as a Context 
for Learning in Advanced Legal Writing’ (2000) 50 Journal of Legal Education
56, 56; Philip A Jones, ‘We’re All Refl ective Practitioners Now: Refl ections on 
Professional Education’ in Webb and Maughan, above n 57, 292–3; Spiegelman, 
above n 73, 262.
133 Bentley, above n 18, 109 (describing the use of moots in a tax law course at Bond 
University Law School).
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5 Compulsory Moots — Time Limitations
When moots are a component of compulsory substantive law 
courses all students are exposed to them. However, because of the 
large number of students normally enrolled in compulsory courses 
and the time and labour involved in conducting moots, the mooting 
experience may be abbreviated (for example, students may have as 
little as fi ve minutes to present arguments in an informal setting).134
While students may receive feedback on their performance and on 
their use of relevant substantive law, unless those learning objectives 
are assessed again in a substantive course, students have little 
opportunity and no motivation to put the feedback they receive to 
use. Students typically will have the opportunity to do only a single 
moot in a course. Although they may be required to participate in 
moots in subsequent substantive law courses, there is generally no 
connection between the relevant courses.
Consequently, in this model, feedback on learning and 
opportunity for repeat performance of relevant skills is limited. In 
these circumstances, it is more likely that mooting will be used for 
summative assessment purposes. A possible solution to this problem 
is offered later in the article.
6  Electives and Optional Moots — Too Few Students Exposed 
to Mooting
In some models, students can avoid moots if they wish, either 
by not taking the course (in the case of electives) or by choosing 
not to do a moot as a component of assessment (where the moot 
is optional).135 In the case of electives, some students who wish to 
participate may actually be prevented from doing so either because 
student enrolments are capped and/or because the relevant electives 
are offered only intermittently.
On the positive side for electives, there is often more time available 
for feedback on performance and for repeat performance of moots 
— because there are fewer students involved. The disadvantage of 
this model is that only a relatively small number of students have 
the opportunity to participate. Additionally, when moots are offered 
as optional forms of assessment, the offer tends to be made at the 
134 Lynch, above n 11, 72 (describing the fi rst moot in the curriculum at Griffi th 
University Law School). 
135 It has been argued that not all law students want to become lawyers and that they 
might not want to develop the skills involved in mooting. This argument loses 
sight of the potential for moots to develop substantive law, and ethics and values, 
in addition to skills. It also overlooks the fact that almost all of the skills developed 
through mooting are generic in nature: see Penny Crofts, ‘Crossing the Theory/
Practice Divide: Community-Based Problem Solving’ (2001) 3 UTS Law Review 
40, 40, 46; Kift, above n 78, 52–3. On the relationship between generic skills and 
legally-specifi c skills, see William Twining, ‘Taking Skills Seriously’ in Mackie, 
Gold and Twining, above n 28, 4. 
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initiative of individual course coordinators. Many teachers prefer not 
to undertake moots because of the time involved. Thus, the moot 
assessment may come and go with coordinators. The problem then 
becomes one of a lack of consistency in the activities offered to 
students over time — some students may not get the opportunity to 
do even a single moot.
A concern that has not yet been raised in the literature relating to 
mooting is that not all students are exposed to it. It is not necessarily 
a cause for concern that some students are exposed to more mooting 
than others, but if we have an obligation to assist all students to 
develop basic competences in fundamental legal skills and to enhance 
professionalism, and rely partly on the moot as the vehicle for this 
development, then it is a cause for concern when some students have 
no exposure to moots at all.     
7 Most Models — Lack of Formative Feedback136
Some of the models discussed above may incorporate feedback 
on learning, in other words, feedback that students can use to improve 
their learning of substantive law and skills.137 There is potential for 
feedback to be given when mooting is offered as a discrete subject138
(although, even then, the focus is on skills, not substantive law) and 
when moots are offered as electives. But experience suggests that 
most models do not explicitly incorporate formative feedback. This 
concern was most recently raised by Gillespie.139
To address the problem, Gillespie suggests that tutors could give 
feedback on skeleton arguments before students are required to present 
oral argument, a strategy suggested earlier by Keyes and Whincop.140
Such a process would be time-consuming and, ultimately, not 
sustainable. Additionally, Gillespie suggests that formative feedback 
on skills could be provided with a mini-moot (a reduced speech) or 
a composite moot (where one student starts the presentation and the 
136 Feedback has been described as ‘evaluative information which may be used by 
students in refl ecting upon and improving their performance in a learning activity’: 
Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 10.
137 Formative assessment is designed primarily to assist students to learn. It usually 
occurs as part of a progressive or ongoing learning exercise. Summative assessment 
is designed primarily to test and certify achievement and generally results in 
provision of a grade to students. It is usually associated with terminal activities 
such as end of semester exams. However, in practice, assessment is rarely purely 
formative or summative in nature and the teaching–learning and certifi cation 
aspects of assessment are often linked: see Rowntree, above n 64, 122; Johnstone, 
Paterson and Rubenstein, above n 63, 7.
138 This does not always occur. The author completed two discrete mooting subjects as 
part of her law degree and neither one of them incorporated formative feedback.
139 Gillespie, above n 1, 33–4.
140 Gillespie, above n 1, 30; Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 2, 37. The time and 
resource demanding nature of the model proposed by Keyes and Whincop (which 
requires a commitment in excess of fi ve to six hours for each moot) might preclude 
its use in compulsory courses with large student enrolments.
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second student fi nishes it). These last two strategies free up more 
time for feedback by shortening the time taken for performance but 
are, as Gillespie concedes, less than ideal.141 No provision is made 
for repeat performance of activities. Taken together, the strategies 
do not, it is suggested, overcome the challenges associated with 
incorporating formative feedback on learning in moots. 
C Other Concerns about Mooting
Some of the problems encountered with moots are a product both 
of the characteristics of the moot and the way in which it is integrated 
within the law curriculum.
1 Appellate Moots are Too Complex for Beginners
Appellate advocacy is a specialist area of practice demanding 
mastery of a range of skills. Experience of mooting at Bond University 
Law School (and literature about mooting in the US) suggests that it 
is too complex an area of practice for most students to handle well 
in their fi rst or second semester of study.142 As mentioned previously, 
students at Bond University were required to undertake an appellate 
moot in their fi rst or second semester. This appears to be the case 
at some other Australian law schools.143 It also occurs at schools 
in the US.144 At this stage in the degree program, students have not 
yet had time to acquire a suffi cient understanding of legal doctrine, 
legal process and legal institutions to use the moot effectively as a 
learning tool.145 Nor have they acquired the skills to competently 
and comfortably handle the complexities of an appellate moot.146 
Students are only just beginning to develop these skills. As discussed 
shortly, students learn best by increments and we should put those 
increments in place for them.
The following problems were observed in the mooting program 
at Bond University Law School. The problems were most noticeable 
in the fi rst semester moot.
141 Gillespie, above n 1, 33.
142 These concerns are raised not only in relation to undergraduate law students in the 
UK and Australia: see, eg, Gillespie, above n 1, 27. They have also been raised in 
relation to graduate law students in the US: see, eg, Martineau, above n 8, 1296; 
Gaubatz, above n 3, 91.
143 The Johnstone and Vignaendra report mentions three law schools where moots are 
offered in the fi rst year program: see Johnstone and Vignaendra, above n 32, 133–
55. Moots have also been offered in the fi rst year program at Griffi th University 
Law School: Lynch, above n 11, 72; Keyes and Whincop, above n 7, 16; and at the 
Queensland University of Technology Law School: Lynch, above n 11, 72.
144 Gaubatz, above n 3, 91; Martineau, above n 8, 1296; McCarter, above n 16 (where 
the author discusses the moot court experience of a fi rst-year research and writing 
course which he claims is required at many schools in the US).
145 Martineau, above n 8, 1296.
146 Ibid. 
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Lack of understanding of the court system and procedural law:
Students appeared to have little understanding of the hierarchical 
structure of the court system. Some students had no understanding 
of the signifi cance or effect of the doctrine of precedent and of the 
difference between binding and persuasive authority. Nor did students 
understand basic trial and appeal procedure. Some students did not 
know which party to a judgment would institute an appeal and what 
relief that party would seek. On a few occasions, students assumed 
that the plaintiff in the trial automatically became the appellant on 
appeal. 
Inability to perform a series of complex skills: As already 
discussed, we discovered that students had diffi culty analysing 
issues in the moot problem and in using applicable case law and 
legislation. Our experience in this regard is shared by some other law 
schools. Martineau encountered fi rst-year law students who were 
‘just beginning to develop their legal reasoning and writing skills’.147
He asserts that the ‘appellate court format is more of a hindrance 
than an aid in achieving the goals of fi rst-year research and writing 
programs because it unnecessarily complicates the written and oral 
communication features of the program and detracts from them’.148
Students in the Bond University Law School program showed a 
number of weaknesses in oral presentation skills. The most common 
weaknesses included:
• Poor communication skills (for example, speaking too quickly, 
using distracting mannerisms, and not making or maintaining eye 
contact).
• Overreliance on written notes.
• Lack of selectivity in choosing the arguments to advance to the 
court. Some students left their strongest arguments until last, and 
invariably, ran out of time to deal with them.
• Diffi culty answering questions from the bench.
• Failure to identify and adapt to the court’s concerns.
• Lack of understanding of basic techniques of persuasion.
We observed common errors in teamwork including failure to share 
the workload equitably, incorrect and inappropriate division of 
functions (such as in relation to entering appearances, introducing 
issues and summarising arguments), and failure to divide and deal 
with relevant issues in a logical and cohesive manner. 
Scaring students to death: Although some students might perceive 
moots to ‘be fun’, many students report that participation in moots 
induces feelings of ‘terror’ and ‘fear and stress’ in them.149 When 
students are overwhelmed, they are more likely to adopt a surface 
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 This is how some students described their experiences of mooting in a survey 
conducted by Lynch: see Lynch, above n 11, 88, 91.
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approach to learning in order to cope.150 At best, they gain only a 
superfi cial understanding of the substantive and procedural issues 
involved. It is unlikely that students will perceive the exercise to be 
achievable (without high levels of anxiety). ‘Achievability’ is not 
just about being nice to students; it is a key requirement for effective 
use of simulations.
2  No Provision for Incremental Development of Skills and 
Knowledge
It is a tall order to require students to grapple with a bundle of 
complex skill sets simultaneously in their fi rst year at law school. It 
is not a particularly effective way to develop skills or to encourage 
deep learning for it is well-settled that skills are best-developed 
gradually by increments.151
Specifi cally, on the subject of advocacy skills, several authors in 
the US (where the fi rst-year law student is a graduate student) suggest 
that students should be given the opportunity to develop skills one 
at a time using less complex simulations than a moot. For example, 
Gaubatz suggests that students be given ‘a single-issue’ argument 
requiring minimal research before they attempt the appellate 
exercise.152 Martineau suggests that fi rst-year law students should 
be given an ‘uncomplicated’ oral presentation153 with minimum 
procedural requirements and specialised advocacy techniques (such 
as a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment) so that they can 
focus on developing essential and basic skills.154
As to when students might be ready to undertake appellate level 
argument, there is no defi nite right answer. Martineau believes that 
upper-level (second- and third-year) mooting programs are also 
inadequate to the task of teaching appellate procedure, practice, and 
advocacy and he urges us to put them in ‘their proper and logical place 
— at the culmination of a study of trial and appellate procedure’.155
This may mean that appellate moots are never introduced in some 
law schools where trial and appellate advocacy courses are not 
offered at all or only offered as limited enrolment electives. That is 
not the course of action suggested here. Students should be given an 
opportunity to do an appellate advocacy exercise precisely because 
it requires the exercise of a range of complex skill sets; however, the 
later it is introduced in the degree program, the better. Students must 
fi rst be taught how to perform the basic sub-elements of the tasks 
150 Biggs, above n 78, 138–40; Joughin and Gardiner, above n 131, 5; Paul Ramsden, 
Learning to Teach in Higher Education (2nd ed, 2003) ch 4.
151 Mackie, above n 28, 9.
152 Gaubatz, above n 3, 91.
153 Martineau, above n 8, 1296.  
154 Ibid. Also see Stuesser, above n 3, 126.  
155 Martineau, above n 8, 1297.  
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involved — skills must be introduced gradually, built, and reinforced 
over time. 
IV ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT MOOTING
The above concerns about mooting may be addressed through 
two initiatives. First, some of the traditional moots in the curriculum 
can be replaced with other simulations that not only better refl ect the 
realities of practice compared with the traditional moot, but which 
also take full advantage of the benefi ts of experiential learning. 
Second, the challenge of integration can be addressed by integrating 
simulations into the curriculum by way of a matrix course; that is, 
one which consists of numerous components which are attached 
to various designated compulsory substantive courses, and which 
are taught and assessed throughout the law degree program (rather 
than in a single semester or year) in such a way as to form a single 
entity.
The suggestions made here are not hypothetical. Bond University 
Law School introduced a skills, ethics and values matrix in 1997.156
Advocacy is one of the modules comprising the matrix. It replaced 
the traditional mooting program that had previously operated.
A Overcoming the Moot Problem
Law schools are not charged with teaching moots. And for the 
reasons discussed above, moots are not currently a particularly 
effective method to teach the knowledge, skills, legal ethics and 
values that we are charged with teaching. Moots can be replaced 
with a number of more effective advocacy simulations. In 1997, the 
Law School at Bond University replaced its mooting program with 
an advocacy program comprising of fi ve components based on the 
following simulated tasks:
1 Parliamentary sessions.
2 Pleas in mitigation of penalty.
3 Written appellate argument.
4 Oral appellate argument.
5 Interlocutory applications.
The components are taken throughout the law degree program in 
the order set out above (the process of integrating these components 
into the curriculum is described in the last section of the article). 
Students begin practice with a relatively simple task and are 
gradually introduced to more complex ones. In this way, they get 
an early sense of achievement and the confi dence to tackle more 
156 For a detailed description of this skills program: see Bobette Wolski, ‘Why, 
How and What to Practice: Integrating Skills Teaching and Learning in the 
Undergraduate Law Curriculum’ (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 287.
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diffi cult tasks.157 The fi ve components are described in more detail 
below. The description is based on information collected in a further 
program review conducted in 2007 and 2008.158
1  Parliamentary Sessions
The fi rst advocacy exercise builds on students’ pre-university 
experiences — most students have undertaken some oral 
presentations at school or college. However, many of them are still 
afraid of public speaking. This exercise is designed to assist students 
to come to terms with that fear. This goal is best accomplished with 
an activity in which students can concentrate on improving their oral 
communication skills ‘unencumbered’ by any legal or procedural 
complexities. The exercise is set in a non-courtroom environment. 
The students’ brief is to persuade ‘parliament’ to their point of view 
on a controversial topic. The exercise is incorporated into the fi rst 
year introductory course ‘Contemporary Issues in Law and Society’. 
This substantive course lends itself to a variety of interesting topics, 
such as the legitimacy of pornography, euthanasia and same sex 
marriages. 
Students have two opportunities to hone their presentation skills. 
They are required to give two presentations at intervals during the 
semester. Before their presentations, students are instructed on the 
role and techniques of persuasion and on principles of effective oral 
communication, and are required to practise a number of techniques 
in mini-exercises in lectures.
For the fi rst session, students are given four minutes during a 
tutorial to prepare a short presentation on one of a number of topics 
that are provided at the tutorial. Once prepared, students then have 
three minutes to present their arguments to the class. The second 
session takes the same format; that is, students are given three minutes 
to make a persuasive presentation. However, this time they are given 
a list of topics in advance of the tutorial so that they may prepare 
thoroughly. After each presentation, students receive feedback from 
the tutor and their peers. They are also required to evaluate their 
own performance using a checklist of performance criteria. The aim 
is to generate a list of three strengths and three areas in which they 
157 This approach to learning (referred to as an incremental or building block approach 
or as scaffolding) is one way of creating ‘linked progression in the structure of 
skills learning’: Mackie, above n 28, 16, 18.
158 This review was conducted using the same methodology as that used for the Bond 
University Law School 1996–97 mooting program review. Original documentation 
is on fi le with the author. In fact, each advocacy component is evaluated, separately 
from the substantive course in which it is contained, each time it is taught using 
student evaluation forms. The evaluation form is designed to elicit qualitative 
comments from students, using a series of open-ended questions. Students are 
also asked to comment on things they liked and did not like about the component, 
and on any changes they would like to see made to it.
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can improve. Students are required to record feedback in a learning 
journal and to carry it over from one session to the next (or, in the 
case of the second session, to the next advocacy component in the 
program).
Students are introduced to the concepts of ethics and morality 
in this component of the program. They are required to consider 
whether or not politicians should lie or stretch the truth, whether 
the ends achieved ever justify the means used, and to refl ect upon 
whether or not passion and engagement with cause are fundamental 
to effective advocacy. They must compare the role and perspectives 
of lay people, politicians and lawyers.  
Ultimately, students are assessed on the basis of their improvement 
between the fi rst and second presentations, on their demonstrated 
profi ciency in a range of oral presentation skills, and on the refl ective 
accounts which they are required to submit to the tutor at the end 
of the semester. The journal entries are marked and returned to 
students. 
Additional aims of this exercise are to:
1 Stress the importance of preparation (having limited time 
to prepare for the fi rst presentation underscores the need for 
preparation, while having opportunity to prepare for the second 
presentation highlights the difference that preparation can 
make).
2 Assist students to give, and to make use of, peer and self-
assessment.
3 Enable students to learn how to refl ect and how to learn from 
refl ection.
2 Pleas in Mitigation of Penalty
The next component is undertaken in the course criminal law, 
which most students take in their second semester of study. The 
component complements that part of the course dealing with the 
principles of sentencing criminal offenders (and the fi rst exercise 
is timed to coincide with lectures on this area). Students also 
receive instruction on the procedure for entering a plea and making 
submissions in mitigation of penalty, on the use of case theory and 
theme,159 and on the structure of pleas in mitigation of penalty. 
Procedural content such as this adds to the realism of simulations. 
Prior to undertaking their fi rst exercise, students are required to 
attend a real Magistrates’ Court to observe sentencing procedures.
To complete the component, each student must present two 
‘submissions in mitigation of penalty’ on behalf of fi ctitious 
defendants who plead guilty to one or more criminal offences 
159 For a discussion of the concepts of case theory and theme, see David Napley, The 
Technique of Persuasion (4th ed, 1991) 9; Thomas A Mauet and Les A McCrimmon, 
Fundamentals of Trial Techniques (2001) 9–11; Kirby, above n 106, 971–2.
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(usually misdemeanours). The presentations are made at intervals 
during the semester before a simulated Magistrates’ Court. A period 
of 10 minutes is set aside for each presentation, allowing fi ve minutes 
for oral performance and fi ve minutes for feedback. Again, students 
record feedback in their learning journals — the same journals that 
they commenced in the fi rst component of the advocacy program. 
The component is not completely true to life as there is no ‘police 
prosecutor’ present when students make their presentations. Instead, 
students are provided with ‘a statement of facts by the prosecution’ 
and with additional ‘confi dential client information’. Invariably, 
there are some differences between the two sets of facts. Students 
have to decide:
1 which prosecution facts, if any, they should dispute and how 
far they can take the issue before they reach the point where the 
submission is inconsistent with a guilty plea; and
2 what client information, if any, they should disclose to the court 
in order to satisfy their duties to the court, to the client, and to 
the public.160
At the conclusion of each submission, the ‘Magistrate’ imposes a 
sentence on the fi ctitious client. The sentence has no bearing on the 
student’s mark.
The component allows students to concentrate on the constructive 
use of facts and on developing basic principles of effective oral 
communication in court in a relatively simple legal setting. There 
are no complicated issues of law to be argued and very little research 
is required.
For the fi rst time, students are introduced to and required to 
critique formal rules of professional conduct. In a group debriefi ng 
session, students must complete a ‘true/false’ exercise on ethical 
matters that arise in relation to ‘guilty pleas’, many of which cannot 
be satisfactorily answered with either a ‘true’ or ‘false’ response. 
Students must justify their answers. They always have mixed feelings 
about representing clients who have ‘confessed’ guilt, particularly 
in serious crimes. Our aim is to encourage students to scrutinise 
relevant ethical rules (such as the cab rank rule), to be aware of and 
open about their feelings for an accused person, and to explore and 
articulate values such as those of access to justice, rights of accused 
persons and rights of victims. More general issues, such as the role of 
the advocate (and the specialised role of a prosecutor) are examined 
and compared to the role and functions of a judge. 
Most students perform very well in this assessment component and 
their confi dence is bolstered as a result. It also appears that students 
get a psychological boost and an early feeling of professionalism 
from representing their fi rst ‘client’.
160 On an advocate’s duties to the client, to the court and to the public, see Richard 
Du Cann, The Art of the Advocate (1993) 43–9; Napley, above n 159, 66–72.
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3 Written Appellate Argument
In the third advocacy component, students are provided with a 
fi ctional judgment involving the law of torts and asked to appeal the 
judgment. Students work alone. They are required to prepare a ‘brief’ 
of approximately 3000 words consisting of a Notice of Appeal (or 
Notice of Cross-Appeal if they act for the respondent) and written 
submissions. They are assessed on the basis of the brief. Tutors use a 
written pro forma feedback sheet to give feedback.
Instruction is given on the function of appellate courts, on the 
different categories of error, on the tests used to determine appealable 
error,161 and on the rules of appellate procedure. Students also receive 
instruction on the content requirements of a Notice of Appeal, with 
particular emphasis on the requirements for a well-drafted ground of 
appeal.162 They examine the elements of an effective and persuasive 
set of submissions (consisting of issues and arguments within an 
appropriate factual context). Of critical importance in this exercise is 
the students’ ability to: 
1 demonstrate an understanding of the function of appellate 
courts;
2 critically analyse the decision, reasoning and fi ndings of the 
lower court;
3 articulate grounds of appeal with clarity, precision and 
specifi city;
4 specify the appropriate relief or orders sought by the client; and
5 write in plain and persuasive English.
There is a measure of artifi ciality involved in this component as 
all students (whether for the appellant or for the respondent) have 
to ‘fi le’ their documents at the same time. The respondent does not 
actually respond to the appellant’s allegations, as would occur in 
practice. However, this is not a problem for it encourages students 
to pre-empt and deal with the counter-arguments to the propositions 
they are advancing, regardless of which side they represent.
A number of pertinent ethical rules (such as the obligation 
to disclose to the court all relevant case law and legislation) are 
discussed in class. Students are made aware of the consequences of 
misstating the law or the facts, of exaggerating, of quoting passages 
of law out of context and so on. These rules sound straightforward 
but, in practice, they are not. Examples are used to identify the 
boundaries of permissible and/or desirable conduct; for example, 
when is an advocate merely putting her or his own spin on facts as 
opposed to exaggerating or even misleading the court. At the end of 
these discussions, students must add to their learning journals. The 
161 See, eg, the tests set out in David F Jackson, ‘Appellate Advocacy’ (1991–1992) 
8 Australian Bar Review 245, 248–9.
162 On the requirements of a well-drafted ground of appeal: see ibid 247–50.
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following questions are used to prompt feedback and refl ection on 
ethics and values:
• Was there an ethical dilemma and, if so, what was it and why was 
it a dilemma?
• What situational factors were relevant to the problem?
• What choices did I have?
• What values are presented in those choices?
• What conclusion did I come to and why?
• Can I justify my actions? Am I comfortable with my actions?
• What were the consequences of my decision?
• What else could I, or would I, do differently if presented with 
these choices again?
Student response to the component has been favourable although 
it is clear that this exercise does not have the appeal of the fi rst and 
second components. 
4 Oral Appellate Argument
The next component of the advocacy module is taught in the 
course Obligations, which is undertaken by students in their fi fth 
or sixth semester of law school. The component is similar to the 
‘traditional moot’ in that it includes oral argument at the appellate 
level.163 There are two reasons why we have retained one simulation 
which functions like a traditional moot — fi rst, because our students 
continue to take part in moot competitions and consequently need 
exposure to the formalities of the ‘mooting process’; and, second, 
because appellate advocacy gives students an opportunity to use and 
bring together a complex set of skills.  
Points of particular interest in this component are:
• For the fi rst time in the advocacy module, students are required 
to work in teams of two, acting as senior counsel and junior 
counsel, respectively, and they are assessed on their ability to 
work cooperatively as team members.
• Each team is required to prepare a written ‘summary of argument’. 
The summaries are assessed separately (and weighted at 50 per 
cent of the marks for the component) and students are given 
specifi c feedback on their work. The summaries are marked and 
returned to students before they undertake their oral presentations. 
This is a particularly time-consuming exercise for tutors, but it is 
required only once in the program.  
• Each student’s oral presentation is approximately 10 minutes in 
duration. An additional 10 minutes is set aside for each student for 
individual feedback. During the process, students must bring out 
their learning journals. Reference is made to feedback provided 
on other occasions. New feedback is added.
163 Students have further opportunity for oral appellate argument in several internal 
and external mooting competitions.
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While a number of students said that they felt anxious and nervous 
doing this component, no one reported feelings of fear.
5 Interlocutory Applications
Students undertake the fi fth and fi nal component of the advocacy 
program toward the end of the degree in the course, Civil Procedure. 
The course contains a drafting component in addition to an advocacy 
component (some courses contain more than one skill component). 
Working alone, students must draft an interlocutory application (for 
example, an application for an injunction or other interim relief), 
supporting affi davits, and an appropriate draft order for the court. 
These documents are marked separately from oral presentations. 
Importantly, students are assessed on their ability to comply with 
the evidentiary and procedural requirements for applications and 
affi davits. All the evidence necessary to support their arguments must 
be contained, in an admissible form, in their supporting affi davits. 
Students then present their application to a ‘judge’. Each student 
has 15 minutes for oral presentation and feedback. By the time students 
complete this exercise, they have developed a useful learning journal 
on advocacy and related skills. In addition to demonstrating the 
usual features of good advocacy, students are expected to articulate 
the facts and evidence necessary to satisfy relevant legal tests and to 
identify and deal appropriately with ethical dilemmas. 
Civil Procedure lends itself to classic ethical issues, such as 
whether or not an advocate should put forward a purely technical 
defence and what are the appropriate limits of discovery of 
documents. Sometimes, students are required to bring an urgent ex 
parte application, one which raises the level of candour required of 
an advocate to the court. The scenarios always contain some facts 
which are borderline-adverse to the client and students must decide 
whether or not to reveal the information to the court. They must 
justify their decisions by reference to the professional conduct rules 
or other applicable norms.
Possibly for the fi rst time in their degree, students are required to 
demonstrate an understanding of relevant substantive law, procedural 
law, and the law of evidence — in addition to demonstrating 
competence in relevant skills. Student response to this component 
is positive. Almost all students regard the component as realistic, 
practical and relevant to practice and to the course work covered in 
Civil Procedure.
Once simulations have been designed, the ongoing challenge 
with experiential learning lies in ensuring that all stages of the 
experiential learning process receive adequate attention all the 
time. That is the subject of the next part of the article, dealing with 
integration. However well simulations are designed, they must be 
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integrated into the curriculum in a way which allows for adequate 
feedback on learning and repeat performance.
B Overcoming the Integration Challenge
The challenges associated with skills teaching and learning at 
law school have been reasonably well-documented.164 There are 
three major hurdles to the expansion of skills programs relevant to 
the present discussion:
1 Skills teaching and learning requires a substantial commitment 
of labour and resources, far more than is required for teaching 
traditional doctrinal courses.165
2 Teachers and students have limited time available to them.
3 There is a perception that skills teaching interferes with coverage 
of already content-crowded substantive law courses.166
The challenge for us is to use the limited time we have available 
effectively and, as a result, to reduce the perception that time spent on 
skills, legal ethics and values necessarily takes away from time spent 
on substantive law. The model of integration used at Bond University 
Law School may prove useful in this regard. It is described in detail 
below.
1  Skills, Ethics and Values Components Integrated within 
Compulsory Substantive Law Courses
The School of Law at Bond University uses a compulsory model 
of integration. The components of the advocacy program described 
above are taught and assessed in designated compulsory substantive 
law courses taken by students throughout their law degree. Wherever 
possible, the objectives of a component are dovetailed with those 
of the substantive law course into which it is integrated.167 We have 
also endeavoured to act on Twining’s advice to involve ‘issues of 
ethics, values, and professional responsibility ... in the learning of 
each skill.’168 This creates synergy.169
164 Generally, on the challenges associated with teaching and learning skills at law 
school, see Wade, above n 8, 183–90; Wolski, above n 156.
165 Wade, above n 8, 183; Hyams, above n 53, 75; Vivienne Brand, ‘Decline in the 
Reform of Law Teaching?: The Impact of Policy Reforms in Tertiary Education’ 
(1999) 10 Legal Education Review 109, 122–3.
166 Wade, above n 8, 189; Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline, above 
n 94, 190.
167 A range of specialist skills-based and substantive law electives is offered for 
students who have a special interest in a particular fi eld.
168 Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline, above n 94, 194; Stuckey, above 
n 55, 820.
169 A term used by DeJarnatt to describe the effect of teaching advanced legal writing 
within the context of a single substantive law course: see DeJarnatt, above n 132, 
56. See also Noble-Allgire, above n 49, 36–7. 
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The Law School at Bond University also endeavoured to 
make skills teaching both incremental and systematic. In order to 
achieve linked progression between the components and to ensure 
uniformity of exposure to skills teaching, we forged links between 
those substantive courses in the curriculum that contained advocacy 
components. In forging these links, we found a cost-effective way to 
provide students with formative feedback on their learning.
2 Creating Links between Components — the Matrix
Advocacy is but one module in the skills program at Bond 
University School of Law. Besides Advocacy, there are modules on 
Legal Research and Analysis, Writing and Drafting, Negotiation and 
Dispute Resolution, and Client Interviewing and Communication. 
There are fi ve components in the advocacy module, but altogether 
there are 20 components in the skills program. The other 
15 components are also integrated into substantive law courses taken 
by students throughout their law degree. Students can complete the 
20 skill components over a period of eight semesters, in two and 
two-thirds years.
We have created links between the components by forming a 
course with those components — a matrix course — which overlays 
and connects all other courses in the curriculum.170 This matrix is 
depicted in Table 1 below. 
The teaching and assessment of each component in the program 
is linked. The same sequence is followed for every component: 
preparation (including special instruction); performance in 
simulations; assessment with feedback in small group debriefi ng 
sessions, followed by student refl ection;171 and then further practice 
in more complex simulated situations, more assessment and more 
feedback.
As will be apparent, instruction–demonstration, further skill 
practice and assessment take place in a different substantive course, 
depending on where the next advocacy component is located — it 
may occur in a subsequent semester.172
Students receive a mark for each skill component they 
complete. The mark is recorded for the substantive law course in 
which the skill component is contained (where it carries anywhere 
170 The word ‘matrix’ seems appropriate to describe this structure. The term is defi ned 
in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘a rectangular array of elements in rows and columns 
that is treated as a single entity’: Thomson, above n 10, 841.
171 Student practice is recorded and students are encouraged to watch their ‘taped’ 
performance. On the potential advantages and disadvantages of using video 
recordings, see Gibbs, above n 59, 41; Johnstone, Paterson and Rubenstein, above 
n 63, 52; Rowntree, above n 64, 138; Steven Lubet, ‘Advocacy Education: The 
Case for Structural Knowledge’ (1991) 66 Notre Dame Law Review 721, 734.
172 Rowntree allowed for the possibility that further teaching and subsequent 
assessment might take place in the following term: Rowntree, above n 64, 122.
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from 10–25 per cent of the total marks for the course) and for the 
course Legal Skills (where it carries fi ve per cent of the marks for 
that course). Students are given a mark for each skill module and 
for the skill course as a whole. The mark awarded to a student for 
a skill module is the total marks he or she obtains for components 
in that module. For example, the fi nal mark given to a student for 
the advocacy module of Legal Skills is the total marks obtained 
for the fi ve advocacy components in the module. The fi nal mark 
awarded to a student for the course Legal Skills is based on the total 
marks he or she obtains for the 20 skill components in the course. 
In effect, the marks for individual skill components are interim 
marks and assessment in each skill module and in the skill course 
is progressive.
All students must satisfactorily complete all fi ve advocacy 
components. If students fail a component, they are required to repeat 
it until they attain a satisfactory level of competence in the relevant 
skills.173  
Students must pass the course Legal Skills to obtain their law 
degree (the cut-off mark for a pass is 50 per cent). They are awarded a 
pass, credit, distinction or high distinction on the basis of their marks 
rather than a pass/fail grade.174 When students graduate, they receive 
the usual certifi cation of academic achievement and a separate skill 
certifi cate that indicates the mark and grade they obtained for the 
course Legal Skills, together with the mark they obtained for each 
module in the course.
3 Formative Feedback on Learning
Assessment in each component of the advocacy program, with 
the exception of the last component, is formative in nature. All the 
prerequisites for formative feedback (set out earlier in the article) are 
met. The assessment incorporates feedback, it is followed by further 
teaching and the relevant abilities and competencies are subject 
to later assessment in subsequent components of the program. 
This has proved to be a resource-effective and sustainable way of 
incorporating formative assessment in teaching and learning. It is 
an approach that works only because of the institutional rules and 
routines governing the program.
173 It is not necessary for students to repeat the whole subject Legal Skills but only 
those components which they initially failed.
174 Opinions are divided on whether a pass/fail grading system is more appropriate 
for skills than a traditional grading system: see, eg, Myers, above n 34, 411; John 
K De Groot, Producing a Competent Lawyer — Alternatives Available (1995) 74. 
See, generally, Charles B Craver, ‘The Impact of a Pass/Fail Option on Negotiation 
Course Performance’ (1998) 48 Journal of Legal Education 176.
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4 A Systematic Approach — Ensuring Consistency
Skills and ethics teaching is planned, structured and coordinated 
throughout the law degree at Bond University Law School. The 
School appoints a continuing senior member of academic staff to 
coordinate the Legal Skills course (the Skills Coordinator), in the 
same manner as it does for any other course. The Skills Coordinator 
is charged with policing the operation of the course, ensuring, for 
instance, that suffi cient time is set aside for simulations to allow 
each student to be adequately assessed and given individualised 
feedback. The Skills Coordinator also ‘controls’ (in consultation 
with coordinators of substantive courses) factors such as the 
weight attached to assessment components, the learning objectives 
considered important, the content, and the teaching and assessment 
methods used to teach skills and legal ethics. Further, the Skills 
Coordinator ensures that these factors do not vary with substantive 
course coordinators, and that agreed skills and ethics are appropriately 
taught at an agreed time and place within the curriculum (in fact, 
coordinators of substantive courses work with the Skills Coordinator 
in designing and assessing simulations because skills coordinators 
are often not experts in the relevant substantive law). For their part, 
substantive course coordinators are willing to live with some loss of 
autonomy over their courses for what is perceived to be a collective 
advantage for the School. In this way, consistency in skills and ethics 
teaching and learning over time is ensured.
V ONGOING CHALLENGES
When the skills and ethics program fi rst began, students were 
quick to point out areas where we fell short. They asked for clear 
performance and assessment criteria, and for appropriate examples 
and model answers that demonstrated the use of relevant skills. We 
have made a series of video presentations for use in the exercises. 
Effective performance of skills is also modelled by instructors.
Students reminded us of the need to ensure that all assessors 
have expertise in the skills being assessed and in skills teaching 
methodology and that assessment is properly moderated. In some 
skill components, the Skills Coordinator (who has expertise in the 
relevant skills) is actually responsible for teaching skills. In other 
components, skills are co-taught by the Skills Coordinator and 
substantive course coordinators. Where there is more than one 
assessor involved, they use standardised criteria checklists and 
multiple-marking of some performances and sample work to ensure 
consistency in assessment.
The most persistent problem centres on the need to provide 
adequate feedback to students on their performance and to allow 
suffi cient time for student refl ection. It is an inescapable fact that if 
Legal Education Review, Vol. 19 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://epublications.bond.edu.au/ler/vol19/iss1/3
 BEYOND MOOTING 81
teachers are to accommodate skills and ethics exercises within their 
classes, they must increase the time they spend in assessment. The 
temptation to reduce the amount of time spent giving feedback to 
students is diffi cult to resist. At a time when the resource problems 
for law schools are increasing, programs such as these need multiple 
‘keepers of the fl ame’. One of the greatest benefi ts of teaching via 
a matrix course is that the load is shared among staff members — 
everyone has a stake in keeping the fl ame burning.
The fi nal point to mention is one outside the scope of this article 
and one which requires further research. While law students enjoy 
skills assessments, attention must be paid to the total amount of 
assessment that students have to undertake during the course of their 
studies. Students in the skills program at Bond University are under 
a heavy assessment load and may even be over-assessed. We have 
not, as yet, seen evidence of surface engagement with tasks but that 
is one possible student response if over-assessment is taking place.
VI CONCLUSION
The Advocacy program described in this article began operating 
at Bond University Law School in 1997 as part of a skills, ethics 
and values matrix. The program was reviewed again in the period 
of 2007 and 2008. It has been energetically sustained over a period 
of 10 years. Overall, feedback from students has been extremely 
positive. Students practise advocacy skills with a great deal of 
enthusiasm in a variety of contexts that they perceive to be realistic, 
relevant, interesting and achievable. The program includes mooting 
but as part of a progressive formative skills process rather than in 
its traditional format. From the Law School’s perspective, we have 
succeeded in shifting the focus from oral presentation as an end 
in itself towards the development of better skills of reasoning and 
analysis, fact selection and use, issue identifi cation, and persuasive 
writing. In the process of doing so, oral presentation skills have 
also improved. We have provided students with the opportunity to 
consider relevant ethical issues and professional and personal values 
continually throughout their degree.   
Maintaining a program such as the one discussed in this article 
is resource and labour intensive; however, no more so than the usual 
mooting program adopted by many law schools. Other schools 
might fi nd one or more of the advocacy components described in 
this article useful, especially if they share similar concerns about 
traditional mooting. It is my view that these components (or similar 
ones) should be used in place of traditional moots where those moots 
are restricted to arguments on points of law before a simulated 
‘appeal’ court. In this way, students could experience advocacy 
in a variety of realistic contexts, which heighten their awareness 
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of critical ethical and professional issues. They can be stimulated 
by their experiences, not intimidated by them. The use of a matrix 
course enables us to integrate skills, legal ethics and values into 
substantive law courses in a way that maintains student motivation 
to learn, ensures consistency of teaching and learning over time, and 
uses limited time and resources more effectively than traditional 
moot assessment tasks.
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